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THE BATTLE FOR THE ARMREST REACHES NEW
HEIGHTS: THE AIR CARRIERS ACCESS ACT AND THE
ISSUES SURROUNDING THE AIRLINES' POLICY OF




A S A RESULT of news stories about Southwest Airlines' policy
of requiring obese passengers to purchase additional seats
on its flights instead of giving them free additional seats, advo-
cates for the obese have focused their attention on the airline
industry. While much of the commentary has focused on the
problems facing the obese in the area of public accommoda-
tions, there has been little discussion of the detrimental impact
that providing additional seats to obese passengers at no addi-
tional cost would have on the already failing airline industry,
and no effort on the part of these advocates for the obese to
reach a compromise that would be mutually beneficial to all
parties.
Many have argued that obesity is an involuntary condition
that constitutes a disability. Therefore, individuals suffering
from obesity should be covered by statutes that protect individu-
als against discrimination. In the context of air transportation
in the United States, this fight has taken place under the Air
Carriers Access Act ("ACAA").1 Advocates for the obese claim
that the obese are disabled and therefore covered by ACAA. In
addition, these advocates claim that, despite the ACAA's crea-
tion of an extensive administrative enforcement mechanism
through the Department of Transportation, there should be an
additional private right of action by which the obese can seek
monetary remedies for alleged acts of discrimination.
1 Air Carriers Access Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (2004).
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This comment begins by summarizing the basic premise for
all of the arguments in favor of providing obese passengers with
an additional seat at no additional cost. These arguments will
be presented as juxtaposed against the counterarguments of the
different parties involved: (1) the airlines based on their finan-
cial condition, (2) those who are forced to share portions of
their seats with obese passengers; and (3) others who desire to
limit the protection of the ACAA and other disability statutes
such as the Americans With Disabilities Act to those who are
"truly disabled."
Following the presentation of the counterarguments, this
comment will discuss the merits of whether obesity can consti-
tute a disability under the federal disability statutes, and whether
there is a private right of action under the ACAA. The com-
ment will then advocate for an acceptable compromise between
the two positions and examine current airline policies under
this suggested course of action.
II. ARGUMENT AGAINST REQUIRING OBESE
PASSENGERS TO PURCHASE
ADDITIONAL TICKETS
While the airline industry uses the number of overweight and
obese individuals to argue the financial impact that extending
coverage to these individuals under the ACAA would have,
others view this statistic as indicating a need to protect a growing
class of people. Morbid obesity "is associated with serious, pro-
gressive, and disabling diseases such as diabetes, high blood
pressure, cardiovascular disease, osteoarthritis of weight-bearing
joints, respiratory problems, gallstones, urinary incontinence,
swollen legs that can develop ulcers, gastroesophageal reflux,
stroke, infertility, some types of cancer, and depression."2 Op-
ponents of policies requiring obese passengers to purchase addi-
tional tickets, such as Executive Director of the American
Obesity Society Morgan Downey, believe that "[i] t's just discrim-
inatory and it's mean-spirited," and that the airline industry "is
singling out a group that's been very heavily stigmatized rather
than making some accommodations in their cabins."'
2 University of Missouri Health Care, Bariatric Surgery for Morbid Obesity at Uni-
versity of Missouri Health Care, at http://www.surgery.missouri.edu/departments/
bariatric/morbidobesity.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2004).
3 David Koenig, Airlines Under Fire for Making Obese Passengers Buy Two Tickets,
The Detroit News, available at http://www.detnews.com/2002/business/0206/
20/business-519253.htm (Jun. 20, 2002).
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III. ARGUMENTS FOR REQUIRING OBESE PASSENGERS
TO PURCHASE ADDITIONAL TICKETS
A. AIRLINES' ARGUMENT BASED ON THE FINANIAL CONDITION
OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
From the perspective of the major airlines operating in the
United States, the argument over whether the obese should be
considered disabled and therefore entitled to accommodation
under the ACAA is simply about money. Even before the severe
losses recorded in 2001 due to the September 11th attacks, the
airlines had begun to suffer a financial decline.4 This decline
resulted from the fact that while operating revenues increased,
operating expenses increased by a greater amount.5 For exam-
ple, in 1999, the airline industry recorded $123.24 billion in op-
erating revenue, while incurring 114.56 billion in operating
expenses.6 This resulted in an operating profit of $8.67 billion
for 1999. 7 However, in 2000, although operating revenue in-
creased to $134.75 billion, operating expenses increased by an
even greater amount to $127.23 billion.8 This resulted in an op-
erating profit of $7.52 billion, a decline of $1.15 billion from
1999.9
Mostly due to the events of September 11, 2001, airline profits
plummeted in that year.'0 In fact, Southwest Airlines was the
only major air carrier in the United States to record a profit,
managing to scrape together a modest profit of $511 million.'
Continental Airlines and Alaska Air Group also managed to re-
cord respectable numbers, recording losses of $95 million and
$40 million, respectively.' 2 America West and Northwest re-
corded comparatively moderate losses of $148 million and $423
million, respectively.' 3 The real damage was suffered by four of
the major airlines. Delta Air Lines suffered losses of $1.2 billion,
4 United States Department of Transportation, Airline Industry Profits Fell in
2000, BTS Year-end Financial Report Shows, at http://www.dot.gov/affairs/btsl301.
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while American Airlines posted losses of $1.8 billion.14 US Air-
ways posted losses of $2.0 billion.15 United Airlines suffered the
greatest financial losses of 2001, recording losses of $2.1 bil-
lion. 16 Altogether, the nine major airlines in the United States
lost a total of $7.2 billion.1 7
Congress predicted the extent of the losses resulting from the
September l1th attacks. 18 Two days after the attacks, Congress
enacted the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization
Act ("ATSSSA"). The act authorized $5 billion in direct pay-
ments to the airlines in order to make up for the lost profits that
occurred due to the four-day stoppage in air transportation that
resulted from September lth and the expected on-going re-
duction in the number of people utilizing air transportation. 20
In addition, the act authorized federal loans and guarantees of
loans to the airlines totaling $10 billion.2 1 However, even with
this extensive federal effort to bail out the airline industry, many
airlines still found themselves fighting their creditors in bank-
ruptcy court.2 2 Moreover, it is important to note that the loss of
$7.2 billion reported for the airline industry includes $3.8 bil-
lion of the $5 billion in direct payments authorized by the
ATSSSA.23 Thus, without these payments, the loss in profits suf-
fered by the airline industry would have been much worse.
The several billion dollar losses in 2001, combined with the
increase in the growth rate of operating expenses in excess of
operating revenues, have put the airline industry in an unstable
position. A study by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics
found that increasing breakeven load factors have also nega-
tively impacted the financial condition of the airlines.2 4 The





18 Margaret M. Blair, The Economics of Post-September 11 Financial Aid to Airlines,
36 IND. L. REv. 367 (2003).
19 Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001)).
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 368.
23 United States Department of Transportation, Airline Industry Reported Steep
Losses in 2001, BTS Year-end Financial Report Shows, at http://www.dot.gov/affairs/
bts1502.htm (July 11, 2002).
24 Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Rising Breakeven Load Factors Threaten Air-
line Finances, at http://www.bts.gov/publications/issue_briefs/number08/
html/entire.html (Oct. 2003).
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seats that must be filled on an average flight at current average
fares for the airline's passenger revenue to break even with the
airline's operating expenses. '25 The study divided the major
U.S. airlines into three groups: (1) "recently bankrupt," which
are airlines that have gone bankrupt between 2001 and 2003;
(2) "at risk," which are airlines that did not record profits from
2001 to 2003; and (3) "profitable," which are airlines that posted
profits from 2001 to 2003.26 The study found that every airline
except Southwest was facing declining breakeven load factors
even before of September llth.27 The practical effect of this
decline in breakeven load factors is that for the "recently bank-
rupt" airlines, selling every single seat on every single flight
would still not be enough to allow them to post a profit.21 More-
over, "at risk" airlines are currently facing breakeven load fac-
tors that are nearing 100%.29
Given the financial instability of the major airlines in the
United States, it is easy to see why requiring the airlines to pro-
vide additional seats to obese passengers at the expense of los-
ing a fare from another potential customer does not sit well with
the airlines. Their argument becomes even more powerful after
a consideration of the number of fares potentially affected. In
the United States, the percentage of the adult population that is
overweight is approaching 66%, while the percentage of obese
adults is approaching 33%.o These percentages translate into
129.6 million adults in the United States being overweight, with
61.3 million of those adults qualifying as obese. 1 In addition to
the sheer number of people in the United States who are over-
weight and obese, airlines are also concerned by the fact that
those numbers are increasing.3 2 From the years 1960 to 2000,
the percentage of adults in the United States who are consid-
ered overweight has increased from 31.5% to 33.6%. 3 Because
individuals who are either obese or morbidly obese are more






30 National Institute of Diabetes & Digestive & Kidney Diseases, Statistics Related
to Overweight and Obesity, at http://www.niddk.nih.gov/health/nutrit/pubs/
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ACAA for reasons stated below, the airlines are even more
alarmed with the recent trends regarding those categories.
From 1960 to 2000, the percentage of obese adults in the
United States increased from 13.3% to 30.9%. 4 Between 1988
and the year 2000, the percentage of those who were considered
morbidly obese increased from 2.9% to 4.7%.35
The airlines acknowledge that not every obese passenger will
require an additional seat, but they contend that even the loss of
a small percentage of fares due to the provision of free seats to
obese passengers could have a drastic effect. 6 Because the air-
line is required to compensate a customer who is bumped off of
a full flight, the airline will essentially lose a fare each time an
obese passenger requires an additional seat on a full flight.3 7
Considering that in 2001, Southwest's entire profit was attributa-
ble to only six seats per flight, the provision of an additional seat
at no additional cost for only a few obese passengers could
greatly reduce or even eliminate its profits. Southwest has
statedtthat "[i]f we were to replace just three rows of three seats
with two seats, each being one and a half times wider, we would
have to significantly raise our fares to maintain our profit mar-
gin."39 The fact that Southwest was the only airline to record a
profit in 2001, coupled with the increasing number of obese in-
dividuals in the United States, has made deciding to define be-
ing overweight or obese as a disability under the ACAA an
extremely controversial issue and one that could have a serious
impact on the airline industry.
B. ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF THOSE FORCED TO SHARE
PORTIONS OF THEIR SEATS WITH OBESE PASSENGERS
In addition to the argument that the airline industry will not
be able to withstand the economic impact of giving obese pas-
sengers extra seats, another argument exists concerning the ef-
fect that not requiring obese passengers to purchase additional




36 A Message from Southwest Airlines, at http://www.southwest.com/travel-





A CAA AND OBESE PASSENGERS
The first example results from a flight on board Delta Airlines
from New Orleans to Cincinnati.4" Passenger Philip Shafer was
forced to sit next to an obese passenger for the duration of the
two-hour flight.41 The obese passenger had arrived at his seat
and raised the armrest in order to fit into it.4 2 Shafer stated that
the man was so large that without raising the armrest he could
not have fit into the seat.4 3 Thus, the man was sitting on a por-
tion of Shafer's seat.44 Because the flight was full, Shafer, sitting
on only a portion of the seat that he had paid for, was crunched
between the opposite armrest and the obese passenger.45 Shafer
eventually filed a lawsuit, claiming that "Delta breached its con-
tract to provide him with a full seat and reasonable comfort be-
cause the obese man crowded onto his seat. '46 Shafer claims
that he "'suffered embarrassment, severe discomfort, mental
anguish and severe emotional distress"' as a result of being
seated with the obese passenger during the two-hour flight.
47
Shafer believes that Delta should follow Southwest Airlines' lead
and require obese passengers to purchase additional tickets.
48 If
this were done, both the obese passenger and those forced to sit
in only a portion of the seat that they paid for would be more
comfortable.
The situation involving Shafer is typical of what occurs when
obese passengers are not required to purchase additional tick-
ets. The following is a more extreme, admittedly less frequent,
example of what can result from the failure of the airlines to
require obese passengers to purchase additional tickets. Sixty-
three-year-old Barbara Hewson was forced to share a portion of
her seat on a Virgin Atlantic flight from London to Los Angeles
in 2001 after the obese passenger had raised the armrest in or-
der to allow himself to sit.49 Hewson suffered more than mere
40 Mark Caudill, Ashland Attorney Sues Over Jet Jam ", NEWS JOURNAL, available at
http://www.mansfieldnewsjournal.com/news/stories/ 2 0 0 20801/topstories/3416









49 CNN/Press Association, Squashed Passenger Receives Payout, Virgin Atlantic
Airways News Pages, at http://www.airlinequality.com/news/virgin.htm (Oct. 22,
2002).
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discomfort during the flight.50 As a result of being forced to
share her seat with the obese passenger, Hewson suffered "a
blood clot, torn leg muscles and sciatica. '5 1 Although Hewson
complained to the flight crew, they were unable to accommo-
date her because there were no empty seats on the flight.52 De-
spite having to pay Hewson $20,000, Virgin Atlantic has refused
to adopt a policy similar to that of Southwest Airlines, which re-
quires obese passengers to buy tickets for two seats.5"
Southwest Airlines has stated that
[I] t is certainly not safe, comfortable, or fair for a person who has
purchased a ticket to be left with only a portion of a seat or no
seat, nor should anyone be expected to occupy less than an en-
tire seat. Further, it's not safe, comfortable, or fair for the Cus-
tomer who is occupying more than one seat to be placed in the
situation of having someone crowded in a portion of a seat.5 4
Supporting this statement is the fact that 90% of complaints
to Southwest Airlines' customer service resulted from passengers
whose seats were encroached upon by obese passengers.
C. ARGUMENT BASED ON LIMITING PROTECTION TO THOSE
WHO ARE "TRULY DISABLED"
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia endorsed the following argument in the context of the
Americans with Disabilities Act in Coleman v. Georgia Power Co.,
stating:
This conclusion is necessary in order to avoid a dilution of the
ADA. The ADA was meant to protect people who are truly dis-
abled. It is incumbent on the courts to faithfully adhere to the
intended scope of the statute so that it does not become a catch-
all cause of action for discrimination based on appearance, size,
and any number of other things far removed from the reasons
the statutes were passed.56
As indicated by the court in Coleman, an illustrative case for
the argument that it is possible for plaintiffs to claim disability




53 Lisa DiCarlo, Why Airlines Can't Cut the Fat, FoRBs, available at http://
www.forbes.com/2002/10/24/cx-ld 1024obese.html (Oct. 24, 2002).
54 A Message from Southwest Airlines, supra note 36.
55 Koenig, supra note 3.
56 Coleman v. Ga. Power Co., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1370 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
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drafters of the statute is a case from the United States Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, Forrisi v. Bowen.57 The plaintiff in that
case sought protection as a disabled employee under the Reha-
bilitation Act,58 which has the same definition for disability as
the ACAA.59 The plaintiff suffered from acrophobia, the fear of
heights.6" The plaintiff was employed as a utility systems re-
pairer and operator, and his job required him to climb lad-
ders. 61  After telling his supervisor that he suffered from
acrophobia, the plaintiff was terminated for not being able to
perform the requirements of the position, despite his insistance
that he would be able to perform the requirements if the em-
ployer would be willing to make some accommodations.62
The court, using the same reasoning that many courts have
used in finding that obesity is not a disability within the meaning
of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, held that the plaintiff
was not regarded as having a disability because his acrophobia
did not "substantially limit" him in a "major life activity."63 The
court found that Congress intended to draw a line limiting the
coverage of the statute by carefully choosing the words "substan-
tially" and "major."64 Thus, for an impairment to qualify as a
disability it must be significant.65 The court went on to state that
It would debase [the] high purpose [of the statute] if the statu-
tory protections available to those truly handicapped could be
claimed by anyone whose disability was minor and whose relative
severity of impairment was widely shared. Indeed, the very con-
cept of an impairment implies a characteristic that is not com-
monplace and that poses for the particular individual a more
general disadvantage.66
The reasoning behind this argument was well-stated in
Fredregill v. Nationwide Agribusiness Insurance Co., where the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa
held that merely being obese, without a physiological disorder
57 Id.
58 Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 933 (4th Cir. 1986).
59 29 U.S.C. § 705 (2004) (defining individual with a disability as "any person
who ... has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more ... major life activities").
60 Bowen, 794 F.2d at 933.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 935.
- Id. at 933-34.
65 Id. at 934.
66 Id.
20041
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causing the obesity, is not sufficient to satisfy the disability re-
quirement under the ADA and entitle the individual to cover-
age.67 The court stated that:
The statute and implementing regulations define the term disa-
bility to incorporate those persons who have physical or mental
impairments which truly limit the significant aspects of daily life
others take for granted, or are seen to have such impairments.
The definition is broad, but it is also carefully stated. It is incum-
bent on courts to faithfully adhere to the intended scope of the
statute so that it does not become a catch-all cause of action for
discrimination based on appearance, size, and any number of
other things far removed from the reasons the statutes were
passed. If the ADA is construed to permit this, the clarity of the
national mandate Congress intended will lose its focus and the
achievement of its purpose will ultimately be impeded. The
treatment of [the plaintiff] because he did not fit the corporate
image may have been most unfair, but it did not violate the
ADA.68
The court went on to state that:
People come in different shapes and different sizes. A large seg-
ment of the population is obese to some degree, and obesity is a
matter of degree. It is a mutable condition for some, immutable
for others. It affects different people in different ways, some-
times not at all. Obesity may be the product or cause of physio-
logical disorders or conditions, but it must relate to a
physiological disorder or condition to meet the statutory defini-
tion of disability as explained in the EEOC regulations and inter-
pretive guidance.69
Thus, the crux of their argument is that only in rare cases
would Congress have intended for obesity to qualify as a disabil-
ity within the meaning of the statute. In order to evaluate the
strength of their argument, it is necessary to look at the lan-
guage of the ADA, the ACAA and the regulations promulgated
to implement those statutes.
67 See Fredregill v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 992 F. Supp. 1082, 1092
(S.D. Iowa 1997).
68 Id. at 1091-92 (internal citations omitted).
69 Id. at 1089.
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IV. "DISABILITY' UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT AND AIR CARRIERS
ACCESS ACT
The ADA states that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the dis-
ability of such individual in regard to... [the] terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment. '70 The ADA defines "qualified
individual with a disability" as "an individual with a disability
who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform
the essential functions of the employment position that such in-
dividual holds or desires."'7 1 The ADA defines "disability" as: (1)
"a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual"; (2) "a re-
cord of such an impairment"; or (3) "being regarded as having
such an impairment. '72
The Air Carriers Access Act states that
In providing air transportation, an air carrier, including (subject
to section 40105 (b)) any foreign air carrier, may not discriminate
against an 'otherwise qualified individual' on the following
grounds: (1) the individual has a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life activities, (2) the
individual has a record of such an impairment, (3) the individual
is regarded as having such an impairment.73
The grounds on which an air carrier may not discriminate
under the ACAA are identical to the definition of disability
under the ADA. Both the ADA and the ACAA define the class
of individuals who are disabled and thus covered by the statute
using the definition in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the prede-
cessor to the ADA.74
Because there are no federal cases dealing with the issue of
whether obesity is a disability under the ACAA, it is useful to
analyze the cases that have examined the issue in the context of
the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, which both use the same
definition for disability. Many of the cases that hold that obesity
is not a disability rely on the regulations of the EEOC, which
70 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2004).
71 Id. § 12111(8).
72 Id. § 12102.
73 49 U.S.C. § 41705(a).
74 See Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 806-07 (6th Cir. 1997); 42 U.S.C. § 12102;
49 U.S.C. § 41705(a).
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were promulgated to implement the ADA.75 Under those regu-
lations, an "impairment" is "[a] ny physiological disorder, or con-
dition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one
or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculo-
skeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech or-
gans), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary,
hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine. '"76
The Sixth Circuit in Andrews v. Ohio relied heavily on this reg-
ulation in holding that the obese plaintiffs did not allege that
they had an impairment because they did not allege that their
obesity was "other than a mere, indeed possibly transitory, physi-
cal characteristic. 77 The court held that the physical character-
istic of obesity is not an "impairment" within the definition of
the ADA unless it results from a physiological disorder.78
In a detailed discussion of previous cases that have examined
whether obesity could constitute a disability, the Sixth Circuit in
Andrews indicated that if a plaintiffs obesity was the result of a
physiological disorder, and it substantially limited one or more
of his major life activities, he could be covered by the ADA.79
The court discussed the case of Cook v. State of Rhode Island De-
partment of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals, which con-
sidered whether morbid obesity could be an impairment within
the context of the Rehabilitation Act.80 The First Circuit in Cook
held that a morbidly obese plaintiff did have an impairment
within the meaning of the statute because a physiological condi-
tion had caused the morbid obesity.8 '
The court continued its attempt to draw a line for when obes-
ity constitutes a disability with a discussion of the case of Smaw v.
Commonwealth of Virginia Department of State Police.82 In Smaw, the
plaintiff alleged that she was covered by the ADA because her
simple obesity constituted a disability.83 The court ultimately re-
jected her claim on the ground that she did not produce any
evidence that she was substantially limited in a major life activ-
75 See Andrews, 104 F.3d at 808.
76 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2004).
77 Andrews, 104 F.3d at 810.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 808.
80 Id. at 809 (discussing Cook v. Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation, &
Hosps., 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993)).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.; Smaw v. Va. Dep't of State Police, 862 F. Supp. 1469 (E.D. Va. 1994).
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ity.8 4 However, the court noted that it is not clear whether sim-
ple obesity could constitute an impairment under the ADA. 5
The Sixth Circuit continued its analysis with a discussion of
Tudyman v. United Airlines.8 6 Tudyman is unique because it in-
volved an individual who claimed to be "handicapped" under
the Rehabilitation Act; however, the individual was overweight
but not obese.8 7 The court found that he did not have an im-
pairment and was therefore not entitled to protection under the
Rehabilitation Act.88
The above discussion, while not providing a bright line test
whereby any and all individuals can be easily defined as disabled
or not, seems to provide an analysis for courts to undertake
when making the determination. The first step in the analysis
will be to determine if a plaintiff is overweight or obese as the
result of a physiological disorder, thus having an "impairment"
within the meaning of the ADA. 9 Regardless of how obese the
individual is, and regardless of whether the resulting obesity sub-
stantially limits a major life activity, if the cause of an individual's
overweight or obese condition is not due to a physiological dis-
order, he cannot be considered "disabled" for the purposes of
the ADA.90
If the individual is overweight or obese and the condition
does in fact result from a physiological disorder, the court must
determine if the individual is substantially limited in a major life
activity because of his being overweight or obese.91 Because the
limitation must be substantial, and the life activity must be ma-
jor, it is likely that merely being overweight or possessing simple
obesity will not qualify an individual as disabled under the stat-
ute. Morbid obesity, however, has the potential to substantially
limit a major life activity, and therefore may qualify an individ-
ual as disabled. But again, the morbid obesity must be the result
of a physiological disorder. 2 This rule seems to be in line with
the EEOC guidelines which state that "except in rare circum-
84 Smaw, 862 F. Supp. at 1476.
85 Id. at 1472-73; see also Andrews, 104 F.3d at 809.
86 Andrews, 104 F.3d at 809 (discussing Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F.
Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984)).
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 808.
90 Id.
91 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2004); Andrews, 104 F.3d at 808.
92 Andrews, 104 F.3d at 808.
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stances, obesity is not considered a disabling impairment."93
The practical implication of this rule in the context of obese
individuals traveling on airlines in the United States is that the
airlines should be able to require any obese passenger whose
obesity is not the result of a physiological disorder and who is
not substantially limited in a major life activity as a result of his
obesity to purchase an additional seat on a flight.
V. PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER THE AIR
CARRIERS ACCESS ACT
In addition to their argument that obesity is not a disability
under the ACAA, the airlines and others who desire to limit the
protection of disability statutes to those who are truly disabled
also argue that there is no private right of action under the
ACAA whereby individuals alleging violations of the act can seek
judicial enforcement and compensation. Under the ADA, there
is no question that a private right of action exists whereby indi-
viduals harmed by employers can seek recourse. Under the
ACAA, however, federal circuit courts have been divided as to
whether such a private right of action exists.
The Fifth Circuit in the 1991 case of Shinault v. American Air-
lines, Inc. and the Eighth Circuit in the 1989 case of Tallarico v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc. both found a private right of action to
exist under the ACAA.94 In Tallarico, the Eighth Circuit ac-
knowledged that no language in the ACAA specifically provides
for a private right of action.95 However, the court went on to
state that a private right of action could be implied, looking to
the United States Supreme Court case of Cort v. Ash for gui-
dance in making the determination.96 According to Cort, when
determining whether a private right of action can be implied
from a statute, four factors must be examined.97 Under the first
factor, the party requesting relief must be a member of the class
of persons that was targeted by Congress to be benefited by the
statute.98 The court held, after a detailed factual inquiry, that
because the plaintiff fell within the statutory definition of "oth-
erwise qualified handicapped individual," she was a member of
93 29 C.F.R. Pt 1630, App. § 1630.2(j) (2004).
94 Shinault v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 936 F.2d 796, 800 (5th Cir. 1991); Tallarico v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 881 F.2d 566, 570 (8th Cir. 1989).
95 Tallarico, 881 F.2d at 568.
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the class of persons that was targeted by Congress to be bene-
fited by the statute.99
The court in Tallarico, looking to the legislative history of the
ACAA and the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act, found that
the second factor was also met concerning the ACAA.'00 Under
the second factor, there must be some explicit or implicit indica-
tion of legislative intent to create the suggested remedy-in this
case, the private right of action. 0 1 The legislative history stated
that the ACAA was enacted to protect disabled airline passen-
gers from discriminatory treatment.102 It further stated that the
legislation was enacted in response to a Supreme Court decision
that held that the Rehabilitation Act did not apply to commer-
cial airlines unless they received direct federal funding. 103 The
court in Tallarico reasoned that because the Rehabilitation Act
contains a private right of action, the ACAA was enacted in re-
sponse to a decision removing the subject matter of the ACAA
from the Rehabilitation Act, and because the ACAA was "pat-
terned after the Rehabilitation Act," Congress must have "im-
plicitly intended that handicapped persons would have an
implied private cause of action to remedy perceived violations of
the [ACAA]."104
The third inquiry that must be made under Cort is whether it
is "consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff."'0 5 The court
in Tallarico merely stated that this condition had been met and
offered no additional explanation. 1 6 The court went on to state
that the fourth factor had been met-answering the question "is
the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an
area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inap-
propriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law"
in the negative. 7 Based on the fact that the four factors for
determining whether a remedy can be implied from a statute
had been met, the court determined that it could read into the
statute the specific remedy of a private right of action whereby
99 Id. at 569.
loo Id. at 570.
101 Id. at 568.
102 Id. at 569-70.
10 Id. (citing United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans, 477 U.S.
597 (1986)).
104 Id. at 570.
105 Id. at 568 (citing Cort, 422 U.S. at 78).
106 Id. at 568, 570.
107 Id.
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an individual may have some recourse for violations of the
ACAA. 108
Two years after Tallarico, the Fifth Circuit in the case of
Shinault v. American Airlines, Inc. addressed the same issue." 9
The court essentially adopted the reasoning of the Tallarico
opinion in concluding that a private right of action does exist
under the ACAA. 110 When district courts began following the
holdings of both Tallarico and Shinault, it appeared that passen-
gers who were harmed by violations of the ACAA would have a
private right of action under the statute.' However, when the
Eleventh Circuit addressed the question in the 2002 case of Love
v. Delta Air Lines, it rejected the argument that a private right of
action can be implied under the ACAA. 1 2 The Love court cited,
as its reasoning for reaching a conclusion contrary to Tallarico
and Shinault, the fact that those two cases had been decided
before Alexander v. Sandoval.13 In Sandoval, the U.S. Supreme
Court clarified the principles under which a private right of ac-
tion may be inferred from a statute." 4 According to Sandoval,
federal courts do not have the power to create a private right of
action because the Constitution gave this power to Congress.
115
However, if the federal courts interpret an existing statute as evi-
dencing that Congress originally intended to create a private
right of action through passage of the statute, the courts may
find that the private right of action exists." 6 The court went on
to state that in determining whether Congress intended to cre-
ate a private right of action, statutory intent is determinative." 7
Therefore, the other three factors in Cort"l8 are only relevant if
108 Id.
109 Shinault, 936 F.2d at 800.
110 Id.
111 Turturro v. Continental Airlines, 128 F. Supp. 2d 170, 180 n.5 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (acknowledging that a private right of action has been found to exist
under the ACAA and citing Tallarico); Adiutori v. Sky Harbor Int'l Airport, No.
95-15774, 1996 WL 673805, at *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 20, 1996) (citing Shinault and
Tallarico in acknowledging that the ACAA contains an implied private right of
action).
112 Love v. Delta Airlines, 310 F.3d 1347, 1360 (11th Cir. 2002).
113 Id. at 1359; Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
114 See generally Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275.
115 Love, 310 F.3d at 1352.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 The other three Cort factors include (1) whether the party requesting relief
is a member of the class of persons that was targeted by Congress to be benefited
by the statute; (2) whether it is "consistent with the underlying purposes of the
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they help to determine whether, by creating the statute, Con-
gress intended to give a private right of action to individuals af-
fected by violations of the statute. 9
The court in Love stated that under the principles announced
in Sandoval, when determining whether Congress intended to
create a private right of action, the courts should first look for
language "explicitly conferring a right directly on a class of per-
sons that includes the plaintiff in a case, or language identifying
the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted. 12 °
No language in the ACAA exists that would explicitly create a
private right of action. 21 However, the ACAA does identify and
define "otherwise qualified individual" and includes the Reha-
bilitation Act definition of disability, stating that air carriers may
not discriminate on the basis of that definition. 22 Thus, the
court was forced to move on to the next step in the inquiry.123
The court stated that the second step in the inquiry is to ex-
amine the structure of the statute for a mechanism with which
to enforce the statute.124 This step is necessary because, accord-
ing to Sandoval, "the express provision of one method of enforc-
ing a substantive rule suggests that Congress intended to
preclude others.' 1 25 Thus, if the court is able to find an enforce-
ment mechanism, the court should not find that a private right
of action was intended by Congress.126
Through a lengthy discussion of the ACAA, the court ulti-
mately identified three enforcement mechanisms created by the
statute itself and the accompanying regulations. 27 The first en-
forcement mechanism that the court identified was the require-
ment that the Department of Transportation investigate claims
of violations of the ACAA. 12s Accompanying the requirement to
investigate is the Department of Transportation's authority to
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff;" and (3) the question
of whether "the cause of action [is] one traditionally relegated to state law, in an
area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer
a cause of action based solely on federal law." Id. (citing Cort, 422 U.S. at 78).
119 Id.
120 Id. (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690 (1979)).
121 Id.
122 Id. at 1358.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 1353.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 1357.
128 Id.
2004] 819
820 JOURNAL OF AR LAW AN COMMERCE [69
sanction air carriers upon a finding that they have violated the
ACAA.' 29 The second enforcement mechanism that the court
identified under the ACAA was the requirement that air carriers
provide dispute resolution mechanisms. 130 The final enforce-
ment mechanism under the ACAA is the judicial review of the
Department of Transportation's response by the court of ap-
peals.1 3' Because it was able to identify three distinct enforce-
ment mechanisms, the court concluded that Congress would
not have explicitly created these enforcement mechanisms in
the statute itself while at the same time fully intending to create
an additional mechanism, a private right of action, by implica-
tion.1 32 Because it was not the intention of Congress to create a
private right of action under the ACAA, the court stated that it
was without power to do so.1 33
The court further stated that the third step in the pro-
cess-examining the legislative history of the statute and the con-
text in which it was passed-is only to be performed if the court
has been unable to determine conclusively whether it was in-
tended by Congress that a private right of action exists in the
statute through its text and structure.1 3 4 Although the court had
already determined that it was not the intention of Congress to
create a private right of action in the ACAA through its exami-
nation of the structure of the statute, the court went through
this third step just to illustrate the strength of its opinion.1 35
The court stated that the ACAA was enacted in response to
U.S. Department of Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans, which held
that the Rehabilitation Act did not apply to commercial airlines
unless they directly received federal funding.13 6 Congress
passed the ACAA in order to protect disabled passengers from
discriminatory treatment by the airlines.137 Thus, had Congress
intended to create a private right of action under the statute, it
would have written language into the statute expressly providing
for such a right of action instead of setting up an administrative




132 Id. at 1357-58.
133 Id. at 1358.
134 Id. at 1353.
135 Id. at 1358.
136 Id. (citing 477 U.S. 597 (1998)).
137 Id.
138 Id.
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cause Congress must have intended to create the private right of
action, the regulations that accompany the statute cannot by
themselves create such a right of action.139
In light of the fact that Sandoval refined the analysis for imply-
ing a private right of action, it is likely that courts will follow the
lead of the Eleventh Circuit and hold that no private right of
action exists under the ACAA. For example, in the first case in
federal court to address the issue after the Eleventh Circuit
reached its decision in Love, the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia addressed the issue in Fox v. American
Airlines, Inc.'40 In Fox, the court cited the decision of the Elev-
enth Circuit in Love, stating that the Eighth Circuit in Tallarico
and the Fifth Circuit in Shinault based their decisions on the
factors announced in Cort v. Ash, and were thus obsolete in light
of the Supreme Court's decision in Sandoval. 4' In holding that
a private right of action does not exist under the ACAA, the
court essentially adopted the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit
in Love.'42 The court focused on the Love court's reasoning that
Congress did not intend to provide for such a right because it
instead chose to design an elaborate administrative enforce-
ment scheme buttressed by the possibility of judicial review. 14 3
Most recently, the Tenth Circuit in Boswell v. Skywest Airlines, Inc.
raised the issue of whether a private right of action exists under
the ACAA sua sponte, as the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Love
had not been delivered at the time the case was before the dis-
trict court.144 The court conducted the same analysis as that in
Love and Fox, stated that it agreed with the Eleventh Circuit's
decision in Love, and held that the ACAA does not contain a
private right of action.'4 5
Despite the Eleventh Circuit's application of the test laid out
by the Supreme Court in Sandoval to the context of the ACAA, it
is still possible for a private right of action to be implied by the
courts under the ACAA. For example, the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts in Deterra v. America West
Airlines, Inc. stated that it did not disagree with the holdings of
139 Id. at 1353.
140 Fox v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 02-2069, 2003 WL 21854800, at *3 (D.D.C.
Aug. 5, 2003).
141 Id.
142 Id. at *4.
143 Id. at *3.
144 Boswell v. Skywest Airlines, Inc., 361 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 2004).
145 Id. at 1265-71.
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other courts that a private right of action existed for persons
harmed by violations of the ACAA that involved discrimina-
tion.146 Instead, that court was faced with the issue of "whether
a violation of a regulation in a nondiscriminatory manner which
did not cause discrimination warrants resort to a federal court
for a remedy. 1 47 The Deterra court was apparently aware of the
Supreme Court's decision in Sandoval, upon which the Eleventh
Circuit in Love and the D.C. District Court in Fox so heavily re-
lied.148 In fact, in reaching its decision that Congress did not
intend to imply a private right of action under the ACAA to
cases involving only nondiscriminatory violations of a regula-
tion, the court specifically cited Sandoval for the rule that Con-
gressional intent is determinative in assessing whether there is a
private right of action under a statute.149 Moreover, the court
again cited Sandoval for the rule that regulations, although "hav-
ing the force and effect of law," cannot create a private right of
action. 150
Although the District Court of Massachusetts' decision in
Deterra was made prior to the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Love,
the case illustrates that even under the test for determining
whether a private right of action exists under a statute laid out
in Sandoval, courts may reach different conclusions. It is impor-
tant to note that the question of whether a private right of ac-
tion existed under the ACAA was assumed for the purposes of
summary judgment in Deterra."' However, it is significant that
the court cited and applied portions of the Sandoval opinion
without engaging in the same analysis as the Eleventh Circuit in
Love as to whether it was Congress's intent to create a private
right of action under the ACAA.152
Moreover, it is also necessary to point out that the Supreme
Court in Sandoval was not faced with the question of whether a
private right of action exists under the ACAA. 153 The Court in-
stead was faced with the question of whether a private right of
action existed under another statute, and simply clarified the
14 Deterra v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 2d 298, 312 n.49 (D. Mass.
2002).
147 Id.
148 Id. at 309.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 312 n.49.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 310-12.
153 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
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test used to make that determination.1 54 Because the Supreme
Court has not had occasion to answer the specific question of
whether the ACAA contains a private right of action, it is possi-
ble that courts will continue to be divided on the issue.
The difference in reasoning between the Eight Circuit in Tal-
larico and the Eleventh Circuit in Love serves as a useful example
of how courts could utilize the same test for finding a private
right of action announced in Sandoval but reach different con-
clusions about whether such a right of action exists. Even under
the principles in Sandoval, Congressional intent is determined
by an examination of the text and structure of the statute. 5 ' In
performing this analysis, both courts noted that the ACAA was
enacted to provide disabled airline passengers the protection
taken from them by the Supreme Court in Paralyzed Veterans.156
The Eight Circuit in Tallarico noted that when Congress
drafted the ACAA, it patterned the new statute after the Rehabil-
itation Act.' 57 The court reasoned that because courts have
found that the Rehabilitation Act implies a private right of ac-
tion, and because Congress patterned the ACAA after that act
(based on the structure of the statute) Congress must therefore
have intended for a private right of action to exist.' 51
The Eleventh Circuit in Love acknowledged that Congress
passed the ACAA in order to protect disabled passengers from
discriminatory practices on the part of the air carriers.159 How-
ever, that court reasoned that had Congress intended to create a
private right of action under the statute, it would have written
language into the statute expressly providing for such a right
instead of setting up an administrative enforcement
mechanism. 6 °
While the possibility of the existence of a private right of ac-
tion under the ACAA has not completely been foreclosed, the
Eleventh Circuit's decision in Love seems to indicate that those
who wish to extend protection to the obese under the ACAA
may have to rely on the administrative enforcement mechanism
of the Department of Transportation. However, as discussed
above, this would only allow obese passengers whose obesity re-
154 Id. at 286-87.
155 Id. at 288.
156 Tallarico, 881 F.2d at 569; Love, 310 F.3d at 1358.
157 Tallarico, 881 F.2d at 570.
158 Id. at 569-70.
159 Love, 310 F.3d at 1358.
160 Id.
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suits from a physiological condition and who are substantially
limited in a major life activity to avoid paying for an additional
seat. In practice, creating a system of documentation and proof
of disability status-that the individual is obese as a result of a
physiological condition and is substantially limited in a major life
activity-would create significant costs of implementation and
ultimately prove to be unworkable. Although it is possible that
the Department of Transportation could implement some pro-
cedure by which the obese could qualify for protection under
the statute, this comment advocates for a different approach
based on concepts created in the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), the regulations promulgated by the EEOC to imple-
ment the ADA, and the resulting judicial interpretations. How-
ever, in order to understand the proposed solution, it is
important to understand the framework created under the
ADA.
VI. FRAMEWORK CREATED BY THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT
Under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (5) (A), the term "discriminate"
includes "not making reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individ-
ual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such
covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of
such covered entity.1 61 Under § 12111(9) (B), "reasonable ac-
commodation may include. . . reassignment to a vacant posi-
tion. 1 62  The House Report explains that although
reassignment may constitute a reasonable accommodation for
purposes of the ADA, the employer is not required to create a
vacancy for the disabled employee. It is only required to reassign
the employee to a position that is currently vacant.1 63 In addi-
tion, the reasonable accommodation requirement of the ADA
does not require an employer to reassign the employee to a po-
sition that would constitute a promotion.1 64 Therefore, for pur-
poses of determining which positions are vacant, positions that
161 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2004).
162 Id. § 12111(9) (B).
163 Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1168-69 (10th Cir. 1999) (cit-
ing H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(11), at 63 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
345).
164 Id. at 1176.
824
A CAA AND OBESE PASSENGERS
would constitute a promotion are not considered.'65 In addi-
tion, the employee covered under the ADA does not get to
choose his preferred form of accommodation.'66 The statute
only requires that the accommodation that the employer offers
be reasonable.167 Moreover, in order to comply with the statute,
the employer only has to offer an accommodation that is reason-
able.1 68 Once the employer has made this offer, he no longer
has any duties under the statute. 69 Thus, if an employee rejects
a reasonable accommodation, he has no recourse under the
statute. In addition, the category of reasonable accommoda-
tions does not include modification of the position. 7 °
In addition to the reasonableness requirement, the courts in-
terpreting the ADA have required both parties to engage in an
interactive process by which the employer and the employee de-
termine a reasonable accommodation that is agreeable to both
parties.17 The employee is normally required to initiate the
process by giving the employer notice of his disability along with
the limitations caused by the disability. 172 Once the employee
has initiated the process, the employer then has an obligation to
engage in the interactive process to determine and ultimately
offer the employee a reasonable accommodation. 3
Accompanying the interactive process is an obligation on the
part of both the employee and the employer to make communi-
cations in good faith.'7 4 Thus, an employer or employee who
obstructs or delays the process, or simply fails to communicate
during the process, does not comply with the requirement to
make communications in good faith.' 71
The Tenth Circuit case of Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc. serves as
a useful illustration of the process created by the ADA. In Smith,
an employee of Midland Brake, employed in a position that in-
volved light assembly, developed chronic dermatitis of the hands
165 Id.




170 Id. at 1170.
17' Id. at 1171 (applying the interactive process requirement contained in 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2004)).
172 Id.
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and other muscular injuries. 1 76 Smith, the employee, sought
medical treatment for his condition, and his doctors recom-
mended restrictions on the work he was able to perform. 77 In
some instances, his doctors instructed him to discontinue his
work for short periods of time. 78 While on leave of absence,
Smith was fired due to the fact that Midland Brake was unable to
accommodate the doctor-recommended restrictions. 179
Under the framework created by the ADA, Smith must show
that he is a qualified individual with a disability, i.e., that he has
a disability that fits within the definition under the ADA and can
perform the essential functions of his job with, or without if ap-
plicable, reasonable accommodation. 80 He would be able to
show that he has a disability within the meaning of the statute by
proving that his muscular injuries and chronic dermatitis of the
hands constitute a physical impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities, including working.'8 He
could also fulfill the requirement by showing that he has a re-
cord of such an impairment, or that he is regarded as having
such an impairment. 18 2
Because reassignment to a vacant position constitutes a rea-
sonable accommodation under the ADA, Smith could prevail on
his cause of action by showing that there existed an open posi-
tion and that he was refused a reasonable accommodation that
would have allowed him to perform the essential functions of
the position.'83 However, if the position was not vacant, or con-
stituted a promotion, he would be unable to make the showing
that this constituted a reasonable accommodation.' Moreover,
if another accommodation was available, reasonable, and
offered by the employer, he would not be able to make a show-
ing that the employer failed to make a reasonable
accommodation. 185
In addition to making a showing that he is a qualified individ-
ual with a disability, Smith must show that he initiated and par-
ticipated in an interactive process with Midland Brake to




180 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, 12111(8) (2004).
18, See id. § 12102.
182 Id.
183 Smith, 180 F.3d at 1179.
184 Id. at 1170.
185 Id. at 1177.
826
A CAA AND OBESE PASSENGERS
determine a reasonable accommodation that would allow him
to perform the essential functions of his job." 6 For example, if
Smith failed to (1) tell Midland Brake of his disability, (2) sug-
gest either that he could be assigned to a different position or
receive some other accommodation, or (3) engage in a dialogue
to determine an appropriate accommodation, he would not be
able to prevail on his claim. 187 Likewise, if Smith could show
that he made Midland Brake aware of his disability, suggested a
reasonable accommodation, including reassignment to a vacant
position, made good faith attempts to participate in an interac-
tive process with Midland Brake, and that Midland Brake re-
fused to cooperate in the interactive process, he would be able
to prevail on his ADA claim.'88
Even if the employee can make all the necessary showings for
his prima facie case under the ADA, the employer can prevail on
the claim by making a showing that the accommodation would
constitute an undue hardship. 8 9 The ADA defines "undue
hardship" as
[A] n action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when con-
sidered in light of... [certain] factors, [such as] the nature and
cost of the accommodation needed under this chapter; the over-
all financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the
provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of per-
sons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and re-
sources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon
the operation of the facility; the overall financial resources of the
covered entity; the overall size of the business of a covered entity
with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type,
and location of its facilities; and the type of operation or opera-
tions of the covered entity, including composition, structure, and
functions of the workforce of such entity; the geographic sepa-
rateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or fa-
cilities in question to the covered entity. 9 °
186 Id. at 1171-72.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2004).
19o Id. § 12111(10).
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VII. PROCEDURE FOR ACCOMMODATING AN OBESE
AIRLINE PASSENGER IF ANALYZED UNDER FRAMEWORK
CREATED BY THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
The Air Carriers Access Act states that " [i] n providing air
transportation, an air carrier, including (subject to section
40105(b)) any foreign air carrier, may not discriminate against
an otherwise qualified individual" on the basis of three
grounds.191 The grounds on which an air carrier may not dis-
criminate under the ACAA are identical to the definition of dis-
ability under the ADA. Both the ADA and the ACAA identify
the class of individuals who are disabled and thus covered by the
statute by using the same definition as found in the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, the predecessor to the ADA.'9 2 In the context
of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, courts have stated that
"[b]ecause the standards under both of the acts are largely the
same, cases construing one statute are instructive in construing
the other." '193 Thus, cases construing the ADA should also be
instructive in construing the ACAA.
If the statutory framework created by the ADA were used in
cases involving obesity as a disability, an equitable solution could
be reached that would allow obese passengers to reduce their
increased costs of air transportation without putting the airlines
out of business or requiring them to substantially raise ticket
prices for other passengers. Under the ADA, a passenger would
have to show that he was a "qualified individual with a disabil-
ity." In this case, the language "otherwise qualified individual"
of the ACAA would be substituted for "qualified individual with
a disability," the language of the ADA.
Applying the ADA framework in the context of obese airline
passengers, the obese passenger and the airline would be re-
quired to engage in an interactive process to determine what
type of reasonable accommodation would be appropriate to the
obese passenger's specific situation. The obese passenger would
be required to initiate the process by giving the airline prior
notification of his condition and discuss the limitations caused
by his obesity, i.e., the fact that he will require an additional seat
on his flight or flights. The airline would then be required to
191 Air Carriers Access Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (2004).
192 Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 807 (6th Cir. 1997) (discussing the defini-
tions of "handicapped individual" under the Rehabilitation Act and "disability"
under the ADA); 42 U.S.C § 12112(a); 49 U.S.C. § 41705(a).
193 E.g., Andrews, 104 F.3d at 807.
828
A CAA AND OBESE PASSENGERS
engage in an interactive process by which both the airline and
the obese passenger would try to determine a reasonable accom-
modation, in this case, trying to rearrange passengers in a man-
ner that would allow an additional vacant seat to be next to him.
Under the ADA, an employer is not required to create a va-
cancy for a disabled employee because such an accommodation
has been determined not "reasonable" under the statute. 194
This should also be true in the context of air transportation.
Due to the unstable economic condition of the airlines, as dis-
cussed earlier, requiring an airline to bump passengers in order
to make room for an obese passenger would not be reasonable.
Not only would this result in a loss of profits to the airline due to
a loss of one fare for each obese passenger on the flight, it
would also anger customers who are bumped, possibly causing
them to use another carrier.
Under the ADA, the reasonable accommodation provision
does not require an employer to reassign the employee to a po-
sition that would constitute a promotion. If the analogy were
extended to the air transportation context, the airline would not
be required to reassign obese passengers to the first-class section
on flights.
If it were determined to be unreasonable in the air transporta-
tion context, to bump a ticketed passenger in order to create a
vacant seat for an obese passenger, the interactive process re-
quirement under the ADA framework assures that the obese
passenger would still have an opportunity to secure a reasonable
accommodation. The interactive process would require the
obese passenger and the airline to work together to reassign the
passenger to a flight that has two vacant seats that the obese
passenger could use. Because in the airline industry, different
flights on different days and different times of the day are more
crowded than others, the airline would be required to work with
the obese passenger to determine an alternative date and time
that would constitute a reasonable accommodation for the
passenger.
As under the ADA, a passenger would not have the right to
choose his preferred accommodation.1 95 The statute only re-
quires that the employer offer an accommodation that is reason-
able,1 96 so it follows that an airline would only have to offer a
194 Smith, 180 F.3d at 1156.
195 Id. at 1177.
196 Id.
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reassignment that would be reasonable. Once the airline has
offered an accommodation that is reasonable, the airline's duty
would be discharged and the obese passenger would have to ei-
ther accept the accommodation or lose any claim under the
ACAA.
However, the determination of what exactly constitutes a rea-
sonable accommodation, as was the case under the ADA, will be
a point of contention for the parties. Questions such as how
many hours, or days, a person can "reasonably" be delayed will
have to be answered. Very likely, these questions will have to be
determined on a case by case basis by the courts or the Depart-
ment of Transportation. Thus, in practice, the airlines would be
likely to reassign passengers to flights that would satisfy the
obese passenger's particular scheduling requirements because
the airlines would want to avoid litigation.
Some advocates for the obsese have suggested that the airlines
could accommodate obese passengers by simply modifying seats
on all flights. 197 If the analogy of the ADA is extended to the air
transportation context, again, a sensible answer to the problem
can be reached. Under the ADA, in the employment context,
the modification of a position to enable a disabled employee to
perform the functions of the position does not constitute a rea-
sonable accommodation. 9 Thus by analogy, forcing the air
carriers to modify existing seats by widening them to accommo-
date obese passengers should not constitute a reasonable
accommodation.
Under the "undue hardship" affirmative defense of the ADA,
if the employee successfully shows that an accommodation is
reasonable, the employer may still prevail if he can show that
the reasonable accommodation would constitute an "undue
hardship."'99 As previously noted, reassignment to an occupied
seat, reassignment to a seat in first class, or modification of seats
on airplanes would probably not be held to constitute reasona-
ble accommodations, as has been the case under the ADA.
However, even if they were held to be reasonable, the airline
could still refuse to provide the obese passenger with these ac-
commodations by showing that they would constitute an undue
hardship. Given the financial condition of the airlines and the
fact that only six seats per flight were attributable to Southwest
197 Koenig, supra note 3.
198 Smith, 180 F.3d at 1170.
199 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2004).
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Airlines' profit in 2001, it is likely that the adjudicator would
find that those accommodations would constitute an undue
hardship.
VIII. SOUTHWEST AIRLINES' POLICY TOWARDS OBESE
PASSENGERS OCCUPYING ADDITIONAL SEATS
Having established the framework with which the airlines'
current policies should conform, this comment will now analyze
different existing policies, beginning with that of Southwest Air-
lines. Since 1980, Southwest Airlines has had a policy of requir-
ing obese passengers who must raise the armrest and sit in an
additional seat to purchase a ticket for that additional seat.2 °°
This policy extends to anyone who occupies more than one seat,
including infants occupying a seat in a restraining device, pas-
sengers placing a musical instrument in an adjacent seat, and
obese passengers sitting in two seats.2"' The price of the addi-
tional seat will vary depending on the type of ticket the obese
passenger purchases for himself.20 2 If the obese passenger
purchases a discounted fare by making an advance purchase,
the cost of the additional seat will be the same as the seat ini-
tially purchased.203 However, if the obese passenger does not
purchase a discounted fare in advance, but instead purchases an
unrestricted full fare, then he will have to pay the price of a
child's fare for the additional seat.20 4
Southwest Airlines' policy of making obese passengers
purchase an additional seat is limited to those passengers who
must raise the armrest between two seats in order to fit in the
seats. 2 5 Thus, Southwest does not rely on the fact that a person
is clinically obese based on the Body Mass Index to determine if
the passenger must purchase an additional seat.20 6 It simply
makes the determination based on whether the passenger actu-
ally sits in one seat, or occupies more than one seat.20 7
Southwest has also taken steps in an effort to ensure that the
process is handled discretely. 20 For example, employees of the
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airline will only inform obese passengers of the policy who will
clearly be required to raise the armrest and sit in an additional
seat.2 °9 If it is debatable whether the person will require an ad-
ditional seat, the employees will not approach the passenger.210
Those obese passengers who have been informed of the policy
and requirement to purchase an additional seat and who con-
tend that they will sit in only one seat are pre-boarded under the
policy in order to allow the employees a chance to determine if
the obese passenger actually is capable of fitting into only one
seat.
2 11
Obese passengers who contest the determination that they
will require an additional seat are not the only passengers who
will receive the benefits of pre-boarding.212 Any obese passenger
who arrives in time will be able to pre-board in order to ensure
that the passenger is able to find two empty seats next to each
other.213 If the obese passenger does not arrive in time for pre-
boarding, the flight attendants will discretely ask other passen-
gers to change seats in order to create two empty seats next to
each other in which the obese passenger can sit.214
Southwest Airlines has an additional policy that gets far less
attention from the advocates for the obese and others who wish
to expand the class of persons who are considered "disabled" for
the purposes of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Air Carriers
Access Act, and other disability statutes. Southwest Airlines al-
lows the obese passenger to purchase the additional seat in ad-
vance. 215 This allows the airline to remove the additional seat
from its inventory and help to ensure that the flight is not over-
sold.216 In addition, as long as the flight is not oversold, South-
west will issue a refund for the price of the additional seat to the
obese passenger.2 17 Therefore, by allowing the obese passenger
to purchase the additional seat in advance, there is a greater
likelihood that the flight will not be oversold and that the pas-
senger will only have had to pay for one of the two seats in which
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ger is given the option of changing to a less crowded flight, for
no additional fee, to help ensure that he gets a refund for the
additional seat that he purchased. 21 9
IX. OTHER MAJOR AIR CARRIERS' POLICIES TOWARD
OBESE PASSENGERS
The policy of requiring obese passengers to purchase addi-
tional tickets is not limited to Southwest Airlines. 22° Continental
Airlines, American Airlines, and Northwest Airlines all have poli-
cies requiring obese passengers who take up more than one seat
to purchase additional seats. 22 1 While some of these airlines do
allow the second seat to be purchased at a lower rate, none of
them are willing to offer a refund if the flight does not over-
sell.222 Delta Airlines and United Airlines do not have a policy
requiring obese passengers to purchase additional tickets. 223
X. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT AIRLINE POLICIES TOWARD
THE OBESE UNDER THE PROPOSED COMPROMISE
Southwest Airlines' policy toward obese passengers is consis-
tent with the approach this comment advocates. Southwest en-
courages obese passengers to initiate an interactive process, but
does not require the obese passenger to do so. Even if the obese
passenger fails to notify Southwest in advance, he may still re-
ceive a refund for the additional seat as long as the flight does
not oversell. Southwest is also participating in the interactive
process in good faith, as they are willing to discuss other possible
flights in which the obese passenger is more likely to get a re-
fund. While Southwest will not create a vacancy or modify its
seats to accommodate obese passengers, they would not be re-
quired to do so under this framework. Moreover, Southwest's
policy of allowing the obese passenger to purchase the addi-
tional seat in advance, allowing the airline to remove a seat from
its inventory in order to virtually ensure that the obese passen-
ger will be entitled to a refund, actually goes far beyond the re-
quirements of the framework. Thus, Southwest Airlines' policy
toward obese passengers complies with the framework advo-
cated by this comment, and has resulted in reaching a workable
219 Id.
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middle ground between the airlines, obese passengers, and
those who would otherwise be forced to share portions of their
seats with obese passengers.
As stated above, Delta Airlines and United Airlines do not re-
quire obese passengers to purchase additional seats on flights.
This policy obviously does not fulfill the requirements of the
framework advocated by this comment. While the policy is ac-
ceptable to both obese passengers who are not required to
purchase additional seats and seemingly to the airlines who cre-
ated the policy, this policy has failed to address the argument of
those who are forced to share portions of their seats with obese
passengers. Thus, through adopting this policy, these airlines
have risked further complaints and lawsuits by angry passengers
which could ultimately result in a decline in the number of pas-
sengers willing to choose their airlines.
The policies of Continental, American, and Northwest Air-
lines, requiring obese passengers to purchase additional seats,
also do not comply with the framework advocated by this com-
ment. While their policies are acceptable to the airlines and
those who otherwise would be forced to share portions of their
seats with obese passengers, the policies fail to address the finan-
cial concerns of the obese passengers. In order to comply with
the framework, these airlines would only be required to provide
additional seats at no additional cost on flights that are not full,
and engage in an interactive process in order to help the obese
passengers select flights that are less likely to be full.
XI. CONCLUSION
The problem of creating policies to address the issue of obese
passengers requiring additional seats on airlines is one that af-
fects everyone who participates in the airline industry, including
the airlines, those who are forced to share portions of their seats
with obese passengers, and the obese passengers themselves.
The vast majority of the commentary focusing on the issue has
been from advocates of the obese who desire additional seats at
no additional cost for all obese passengers. However, their argu-
ments ignore the economic reality in which the airline industry
exists, one that has recently been faced with financial instability.
In response to this commentary, some airlines have adopted
policies providing additional seats at no additional cost to obese
passengers, blindly disregarding even their own financial con-
cerns. Other airlines have ignored the concerns of the obese
and required all obese passengers to purchase additional seats,
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while at the same time providing no refund in the event that a
flight contains empty seats. This comment advocates for an ap-
proach that addresses the concerns of all the parties involved,
and reaches a workable middle ground. Under this approach,
obese passengers will not be required to purchase an additional
seat if a flight contains empty seats, and airlines will be required
to work with the obese passengers to find flights that are not
likely to be full. In addition, other passengers will not be forced
to choose between having to share a portion of the seat for
which they paid and being bumped from flights because an ad-
ditional seat must be provided to an obese passenger. Moreo-
ver, the airlines will not be significantly affected financially, as
evidenced by the fact that the only airline to turn a profit in
2001 did so while maintaining a policy similar to that advocated
by this comment. Further evidence of the economic feasibility
of such an approach is the fact that in August 2003, the airline
industry in the United States recorded unused seat miles of
45.24 billion.224 Therefore, by simply helping obese passengers
find flights that contain unused seats and allowing them to sit in
them at no additional cost, the airlines can implement a policy
that addresses the needs of obese passengers, those passengers
who would otherwise be forced to share portions of their seats
with obese passengers, and their own economic concerns. 225
224 Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Domestic Flights: Air Passengers, at http://
www.bts.gov/publications/white-houseeconomic-statistics-briefingroom/
third-quarter_2003/html/domestic flights air passengers.html.
225 In practice, this policy could be implemented either voluntarily by the air-
lines, as was the case in the implementation of Southwest Airlines' policy, or it
could be facilitated by the Department of Transportation. Because it is unlikely
that a private right of action exists under the ACAA whereby an obese passenger
can seek a remedy for alleged ACAA violations, the enforcement mechanism
through the Department of Transportation is likely the only avenue through
which complaints will be addressed. While under the ACAA, the Department of
Transportation can only remedy complaints affecting those who are disabled (in
this case, those who have obesity that results from a physiological disorder and
are severely limited in a major life activity), the Department could insist on imple-
menting the policy advocated for by this comment for those who qualify as being
disabled within the meaning of the statute. However, the current position of the
Department is that under the ACAA, airlines "are not required to furnish more
than one seat per ticket or to provide a seat in a class of service other than the
one the passenger has purchased." 14 C.F.R. § 382.38(i) (2004).
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